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Abstract: Economic growth and development depends to a large extent on a fair 
marketplace, whereby all firms play by the same rules. Effective rule of law and strong 
regulatory enforcement regimes make this possible in most developed countries. 
Emerging markets are much less successful in regulating firms, leading to extensive 
informal economies replete with unregulated firms. These unregulated firms undercut 
the market by evading the costs associated with legitimate firm operations, skirting 
taxation and discouraging investment in the formal marketplace. Many emerging 
market governments have responded to this problem with formalization programs 
aimed at incentivizing the movement of informal firms into the formal economy. In this 
paper, we assess a recent and comprehensive formalization program to evaluate its 
strategy and success. We conclude that an incentivization program like this one, aimed 
at reducing the costs of doing business, misses the underlying structural deficiencies 
that lead to high levels of informality. We recommend a more nuanced approach that 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
The informal economy is a creation of the law.1 In every economic 
environment, laws, rules, and regulations shape the nature of business 
transactions. They set in place the rules of the game for economic activities. 
But they also create a division between acceptable and unacceptable business 
practices. The division here is not necessarily between lawful and unlawful 
activities, but rather between regulated and unregulated activities, the latter 
forming what has come to be known as the informal economy.2 
As a country develops economically, a regulatory structure emerges to 
protect and sustain that growth.3 Businesses face increased regulations on 
labor, financial, safety, and health; contracts are subject to more judicial 
scrutiny; and employees receive more protections under the law. This results 
in a balanced approach to growth, allowing businesses to succeed within 
necessary regulatory structures. However, the success of that balance is 
largely in the hands of enforcement authorities; without effective 
enforcement of laws and regulations, firms are likely to resort to 
unconstrained endeavors. 
Enforcement in countries such as the United States relies on a 
combination of regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and others, as well as the 
Congress in its support of governing statutes, and the judiciary in its 
interpretation of both statutes and regulations enforced by agencies. 
Aggressive enforcement combined with a  general distaste for bad actors in 
business helps to incentivize compliance. As one example, the Connecticut 
Secretary of State has fined small businesses that have failed to register their 
firm with the state, yielding penalties as high as $54,000.4 
But it takes more than effective enforcement of the law to convince a 
business that it should operate as part of the regulated economic framework 
of a country. There must be a clear benefit for the business to do so, or else 
it would appear more reasonable to operate in the shadows of the law (e.g., 
running an unlicensed business out of your home). The benefits of registering 
a business and operating lawfully in a developed country like the United 
 
 1 A firm is considered “informal” if it fails to comply with one or more significant business 
regulations. See, e.g., Rafael la Porta and Andrei Shleifer, Informality and Development, 28 J. ECON. 
PERSPECT. 109 (2014).  
 2 Also known as the gray market, this segment of society refers to unregulated, not illegal, commerce. 
Illegal commerce is categorized in the black market.  
 3 See, e.g., Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, 
WORLD BANK 1 (2014). 
 4 See David Swerdloff & Benjamin Wiles, Doing Business in CT: Failure to Register Proves Costly, 
MONDAQ (July 25, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/254074/tax+authorities/Doing+ 
Business+in+CT+Failure+to+Register+Proves+Costly. 
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States are numerous.5 They include access to credit in the form of bank loans; 
access to seed funding through agencies such as the Small Business 
Association; tax deductions for business expenses; protection against 
personal liability (depending on the type of business); enforcement of 
contracts in courts; the ability to rent or buy commercial space; the ability to 
legitimately import or export goods; and many more. With these benefits in 
place, and rigid enforcement of business regulations, operating outside the 
formal marketplace in the United States creates more risk than reward.6 
Accordingly, in developed countries, the informal economy is minimal, 
limited often to home businesses just starting out.7 
This is not the case in emerging markets.8 There, a combination of weak 
law enforcement and lack of incentives to operate formally result in a vast 
informal marketplace. Small and micro-enterprises face more risk by 
operating within the formal economy than without, including paying license 
fees, taxes, and substantial contibutions to employee health and pension 
plans, as well as facing rigid labor laws that limit their ability to hire and fire 
at will, in exchange for exceedingly few, if any, benefits. 
Developing country governments have faced large-scale informal 
economic activity for decades with little ability to curb it. A number of 
theories emerged as to how informal firms can be enticed to operate in the 
regulated marketplace. The most prominent theory, and the one that informs 
the case study we discuss in this paper, is known as the Legalist Theory.9 
That theory suggests that informal firms are aspiring entrepreneurs held back 
by an excessive regulatory state. We disagree. 
In this article, we argue that removing regulatory barriers to firm 
registration and operation, while helpful for some types of new firms, fails to 
address the underlying structural difference between formal and informal 
firms. We analyzed a prime example of what has come to be called a 
formalization program, which is an effort by an emerging market state to 
regulate its informal firms by reducing regulatory barriers. Using data from 
several governmental sources, we found that programs like this attract a small 
number of firms into the formal marketplace but have little to no effect on 
the overall size of the informal economy. We surmise that this lack of impact 
 
 5 See generally Demetra Smith Nightingale & Stephen A. Wandner, Informal and Nonstandard 
Employment in the United States: Implications for Low-Income Working Families, URBAN INSTITUTE 
BRIEF NO. 20 (Aug. 2011). 
 6 See, e.g., Alejandro Portes & Saskia Sassen-Koob, Making it Underground: Comparative Material 
on the Informal Sector in Western Market Economies, 93 AM. J. SOCIOL. 30 (1987). 
 7 See, e.g., MARTHA CHEN, Rethinking the Informal Economy:  Linkages with the Formal Economy 
and the Formal Regulatory Environment, 46 DESA Working Paper, 11 (2007). 
 8 See, e.g., Informality in Emerging Markets: A Cross-country Examination, GLOBAL FAIRNESS 
INITIATIVE (2012).  
 9 See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1989). 
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on the overall size of the informal marketplace results from gaps created by 
transitioning firms that are filled by new informal firms. 
Informal firm activity exists in every country. We chose Colombia as 
the emerging market of choice because of its history of high firm informality, 
increasing exposure to foreign investment, and extensive efforts to mitigate 
the effects of informality on its growing economy.10 We will analyze the 
cornerstone of their formalization program, Law 1429, as an example of the 
Legalist approach followed by other emerging markets as well as 
international institutions. 
 II. UNREGULATED FIRMS HURT ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Enterprise informality exists in all parts of the world, making up a small 
part of developed country markets and a more substantial part of emerging 
markets.11 However, in developed country markets, informality is an 
abberration from the norm—often a temporary or even unintentional act by 
an otherwise legitimate business. In emerging markets, as many as three-
quarters of functioning firms intentionally and permanently operate 
informally.12 
Many authors have addressed the impact of large informal markets on 
laborers, who often suffer from unfair wages and working conditions, lack of 
long-term benefits and stability, and the unpredictable prospect of finding 
work.13  In this paper, we are reviewing the impact of informal micro-
enterprises—those consisting of fewer than 11 employees—to better 
understand their role within the broader economy, as well as their impact on 
economic growth. 
Firm informality is widely criticized as a negative force on an 
economy.14 Critiques focus on three principal negative effects on an 
 
 10  Luis Andrade & Andres Cadena, Colombia’s Lesson in Economic Development, MCKINSEY & CO. 
(July 2010), http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/americas/colombias-lesson-in-economic-
development. 
 11  ALEJANDRO PORTES, MANUEL CASTELLS, & LAUREN BENTON, THE INFORMAL ECONOMY:  
STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 18–22 (1989). 
 12  Rafael La Porta & Andei Shleifer, The Unofficial Economy and Economic Development, BPEA 275 
(2008). 
 13  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BAJADA & FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER, SIZE, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY (2005); Marilyn Carr & Martha Alter Chen, Globalization and the 
Informal Economy: How Global Trade and Investment Impact on the Working Poor, INT’L LABOUR ORG. 
(2001); INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, REPORT VI: DECENT WORK AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
(2002), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc90/pdf/rep-vi.pdf.  
 14  See, e.g., Inter-American Development Bank, Entrepreneurial Strengthening and Formalization to 
500 Informal Businesses 115 (2008); Diana Farrell, The Hidden Dangers of the Informal Economy, 
MCKINSEY QUART. (July 2004), http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/employment-and-growth/the-
hidden-dangers-of-the-informal-economy. 
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emerging market economy: 1) it exacerbates weak rule of law and an inability 
of the state to mandate compliance with business laws and regulations; 2) it 
creates unfair competition, disincentivizing legitimate investments; and 3) it 
discourages improvements in productivity, reducing overall economic 
growth and development. Combined, these factors may limit the upward 
mobility of emerging markets and make them unattractive destinations for 
foreign capital. We address each of these in turn below. 
 A. Weak Rule of Law 
Rule of law refers to overall compliance with laws and regulations as 
well as respect for legal authority in a country—the supremacy of law over 
the sovereign, requiring the state to respect and adhere to the law.15  In a more 
practical sense, rule of law refers to the legitimacy of the state as perceived 
by its citizens. The existence of laws and regulations does not equate with 
rule of law.16  Accordingly, one of the indicators of weak rule of law is 
evasion of existing laws through corruption or simple avoidance. 
The World Bank estimates that corruption and weak rule of law can 
reduce annual GDP growth by 0.5 to 1.0% annually.17  A culture of law 
avoiders substantially weakens rule of law, which scholar Douglass North 
emphasizes as one of the key elements of economic development.18  He 
argues that long-run economic growth cannot occur in the absence of rule of 
law.19 
Operating a business in a manner that intentionally circumvents laws or 
regulations or that utilizes back channels to acquire legal benefits reflects a 
lack of respect for legal rules and a perception of little risk in being caught.20 
Daniel Ostas has convincingly argued that a firm will tend to avoid 
complying with procedural laws or regulations that would impact their profit 
margin if they believe the risk of discovery is low.21 In the case of informal 
firms in emerging markets, they often avoid the foundational requirements 
of operating a business, such as paying registration fees, taxes, and employee 
benefits. 
Informal economic scholar Hernando de Soto argued that “informal 
 
 15  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 30 (2004).  
 16  Id. at 28. 
 17  Worldwide Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 
index.aspx#home (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
 18  Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 367 (1994). 
 19  Id. 
 20  Commission on the Private Sector & Development, Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making 
Business Work for the Poor, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 1 (2004) [hereinafter UNDP]. 
 21  Daniel T. Ostas, Legal Loopholes and Underenforced Laws: Examining the Ethical Dimensions of 
Corporate Legal Strategy, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 487, 491–93 (2009). 
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activities burgeon when the legal system imposes rules which exceed the 
socially accepted legal framework – does not honor the expectations, choices, 
and preferences of those whom it does not admit within its framework – and 
when the state does not have sufficient coercive authority.”22 In this vein, 
when more than half of the business community in most emerging markets 
is operating outside the scope of the law, the exception becomes the rule and 
the state loses legitimacy for both informal and formal firms. 
“On average, firms in Latin America are less confident that their judicial 
system will enforce contractual and property rights disputes than are firms in 
other regions of the world.”23 Distrust in the state has given rise to a culture 
of law avoiders that find it beneficial, and often lucrative, to operate 
otherwise legitimate business endeavors outside the regulatory purview of 
the state.24 
 B. The Deterrent Effect on Foreign Investment 
The World Bank issued a major report in 2007 on informality in which 
they concluded that a large informal enterprise sector has an overall negative 
impact on the investment climate, which can threaten the ability of that 
emerging economy to participate in the global economy.25 Their conclusion 
is based on the premise that large informal enterprise sectors create unfair 
competition both on their own account and also as “feeder” firms for larger 
domestic enterprises.26 A foreign firm must comply with often costly 
domestic regulations, whereas an informal firm may evade these costs, 
allowing them to operate at a lower cost and sell more competitively to 
consumers and other firms.27 
In another study, looking at Turkey, the author argued that informality 
was one of the principal reasons that Turkey maintains low levels of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) despite its many attractive economic features.28  In 
another study, looking at EU accession countries, the author asserted that 
foreign firms see large informal enterprise sectors as giving domestic firms 
 
 22  HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM 12 (2002). 
 23  GUILLERMO E. PERRY, ET AL., INFORMALITY: EXIT AND EXCLUSION 220 (2007). 
 24  See, e.g., Michael Ingram, et al., Why Do Firms Choose to be Informal? Evidence from Enterprise 
Surveys in Africa, WORLD BANK WORKING PAPER (2007).  
 25  Id. 
 26  See, e.g., Columbia and Mexico Country Management Unit, Report No. 42698-CO, Informality in 
Colombia: Implications for Worker Welfare and Firm Productivity, WORLD BANK 72 (2010)(explaining 
the results of World Bank Enterprise surveys in which formal enterprises described informal competition 
as a severe obstacle to their operations).  
 27  Aprajit Mahajan, Nicholas Bloom, David McKenzie & John Roberts, Why do Firms in Developing 
Countries Have Low Productivity?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 619, 621–22 (2010). 
 28  Suleyman Tulug Ok, What Drives Foreign Direct Investment into Emerging Markets?, 40 
EMERGING MARKETS FIN. & TR. 101, 114 (2004). 
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an unfair competitive advantage.29 
Entrepreneurs who operate formally are hurt by the implicit subsidies 
that informal enterprises receive through uneven enforcement and by 
poor mechanisms for protecting property and contracts, both of which 
distort competition. Both aspects create an uneven playing field and 
reduce formal entrepreneurs’ access to inputs and markets, 
discouraging entrepreneurs who operate formally from making 
investments to increase productivity.30 
Additionally, this uneven playing field disincentivizes formalization by 
rewarding unlawful behavior. 
The U.S. Foreign Commercial Service, part of the Department of 
Commerce, issued a report on Doing Business in Colombia in 2013 in which 
they highlight a large informal sector that evades taxes as a risk to 
investment.31  Similarly, the U.S. Small Business Administration funded a 
study on the U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement, which took effect in 
2012, and suggested that new rules under the Agreement may facilitate a 
reduction in the trade-distorting informal economy in Colombia.32 
In addition to serving as a deterrent to potential foreign investors afraid 
of unfair competition, the permissive unfair competition may be producing a 
self-reinforcing effect. As more foreign firms invest in emerging markets, 
competition increases, leading some domestic firms to look for cost-cutting 
measures. This could incentivize more reliance on inputs from informal firms 
or informal labor to stay competitive.33 This can drive out foreign investors 
or, at the very least, expand reliance on informal firms. And with little 
enforcement to prevent reliance on informal firms, the cycle continues 
unabated. 
 C. Low Productivity 
Domestic economic growth in many emerging markets is hampered by 
low productivity and weak foreign investment.34 Informal firms have limited 
resources, reduced access to credit, and often little if any training in 
 
 29  BOYAN BELEV, THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN THE EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES: SIZE, SCOPE, 
TRENDS AND CHALLENGES IN THE PROCESS OF EU ENLARGEMENT (2003). 
 30  See UNDP, supra note 20, at 21.  
 31  Jeff Hamilton, Doing Business in Colombia, U.S. FOREIGN COMM. SERV. (2013). 
 32   U.S. Export Opportunities to Colombia, SAINT FRANCIS UNIVERSITY & SAINT VINCENT COLLEGE 
SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CENTERS (2013), http://www.pasbdc.org/uploads/ 
media_items/colombia-international-business-resource-guide.original.pdf.  
 33  See, e.g., Pablo Acosta, Informal Jobs and Trade Liberalization in Argentina, 50 J. DEV. STUD. 
1104 (2014). 
 34  See Bloom, supra note 27. 
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techniques that might help them become productive.35 Accordingly, 
informality is generally associated with low firm productivity.36 Former 
World Bank economists Rafael La Porta and Andrei Schleifer call informal 
firms, “Small, Unproductive, and Stagnant.”37  In their seminal 2008 study, 
they found “extreme inefficiencies” in informal business activity across the 
globe, even after taking into account underreporting and and firm size.38 
Differences in productivity between informal and formal firms could be 
related to limited access to financial services as well as access to new 
markets. Bigger firms usually are more productive and have more capacity 
to respond to higher market demand. However, the causality could also be 
the other way around; firms that face greater demand from markets are forced 
to increase their productivity and grow so to fulfilled the new product orders/
demand. ”One of the main factors that may lead to a productivity gap 
between formal and informal firms is the lack of access to markets and 
services.”39  In the informal economy, many of the benefits traditionally 
associated with a formal firm, such as access to credit, enforcement of 
contracts through the courts, and protection of property rights, are missing or 
more costly to access, leading to reliance on less efficient outcomes as 
alternative mechanisms to operate a business.40  In addition, informal firms 
tend to be small and, given their need to stay out of the spotlight, they tend 
to avoid expansion. By constraining their size, they limit their ability to scale 
their operations. 
Studies across the globe have shown that informal firms in general are 
less productive than formal firms. A study of the Mexican economy by the 
Inter-American Development Bank found that small firms working with non-
salaried contracts (e.g., self-employment) had lower productivity than larger, 
formal firms.41 In another study of three African economies, the authors 
found a significant gap between informal entrepreneurs (opportunists) and 
informal necessity workers, concluding that the latter group, which worked 
informally to survive rather than to thrive, was far less productive than the 
former group.42 
 
 35  See, e.g., NANCY BENJAMIN, INFORMAL ECONOMY AND THE WORLD BANK, 7-8 (2014). 
 36  Pablo Fajnzylber, Informality, Productivity and the Firm, in WORLD BANK, INFORMALITY, EXIT 
AND EXCLUSION 157, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/CH6.pdf. 
 37  Rafael la Porta and Andrei Shleifer, Informality and Development, 28 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 109, 
112 (2014). 
 38  Id. 
 39  EROL TAYMAZ, INFORMALITY AND PRODUCTIVITY 4, WORLD BANK BACKGROUND PAPER (2009). 
 40  See id.at 5. 
 41  MATIAS BUSSO, MARIA VICTORIA FAZIO & SANTIAGO LEVY, (IN)FORMAL AND (UN)PRODUCTIVE: 
THE PRODUCTIVITY COSTS OF EXCESSIVE INFORMALITY IN MEXICO, (2012). 
 42  Mohammad Amin, Labor Productivity in the Informal Sector: Necessity vs. Opportunity Firms 
(2009), http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/GIAWB/EnterpriseSurveys/Documents/Research 
Papers/Labor-Productivity-in-the-Informal-Sector.pdf. 
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The small size of informal firms may also play a role in limiting their 
productivity. According to Friedrich Schneider, who conducted an extensive 
analysis of informality around the world, small firm size caused by a desire 
to avoid detection prevents otherwise productive enterprises from expanding 
their business and taking advantage of specialization and efficiencies gained 
by adding employees.43 Using enterprise survey data, Maloney and Perry 
suggest that there may be a negative correlation between firm productivity 
and informality. They assert that as firms become more productive, they are 
less likely to be informal.44 Of course, as they recognize, this correlation may 
have little relation to the ability of the state to increase the productivity of 
existing informal firms and may instead relate to the firm’s ability to shed its 
informal skin once it finds an avenue toward earning sufficient profit as a 
formal enterprise. Rather, this merely shows that firms that are formal are 
more productive than firms that are not, which is logical given the small size, 
inefficient operation, and limited resources of an informal firm. 
Firm productivity has long been linked to economic growth.45  Increases 
in marginal productivity are generally measured by calculating the change in 
output gained from one additional unit of input (labor, land, or capital). These 
changes can come from capital investments, technology, or from 
specialization and growth, for example. As a firm becomes more productive, 
it is able to increase its profits without changing the number of hours 
worked.46  For an informal firm to increase profits, it must generally operate 
for longer hours. 
In Colombia, firm productivity and formality are high priorities for the 
state.47 As Colombia rapidly integrates into the world economy by 
negotiating bilateral and regional trade agreements, lowering tariff levels, 
and changing laws to protect foreign investors, the informal economy has 
become a barrier to successful economic growth. Thus, significant resources 
have been funneled into the resolution of this dilemma.48  For instance, the 
 
 43  FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER, SIZE AND MEASUREMENT OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN 110 COUNTRIES 
AROUND THE WORLD 159–60 (2002). 
 44  See PERRY ET AL., supra note 23, at 160. 
 45  Diana Farrell, The Hidden Dangers of the Informal Economy, 3 MCKINSEY QUART. (2006). 
 46  BUSSO, supra note 41. 
 47  Mauricio Santa Maria & Sandra Rozo, Iniformalidad Empresarial en Colombia:  Alternativas para 
Impulsar la Productividad, el Empleo y los Ingresos (Firm Informality in Colombia:  Alternatives to 
Stimulate Productivity, Employment, and Investment), INTER-AM. DEVELOP. BANK WORKING PAPER 
(2008). 
 48  See, e.g., Gobierno Busca Estrategias para Combatir Informalidad (Government Searches for 
Strategies to Combat Informality), Portafolio, Sept. 8, 2011; Colombia y OIT Sellan Alianza para Luchar 
Contra la Informalidad y la Pobreza en el Campo (Colombia and ILO Sign an Alliance to Combat 
Informality and Poverty in the countryside), Col. Ministry of Labor, June 6, 2015 (announcing an alliance 
between Colombia and the International Labor Organization to combat informality), 
http://www.mintrabajo.gov.co/junio-2015/4535-colombia-y-oit-sellan-alianza-para-luchar-contra-la-
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Colombian Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, at the forefront of 
trade development in Colombia, maintains an office of formalization.49 This 
office initiated a program known as Colombia se Formaliza (Colombia 
Formalizes), which is a joint initiative led by the Ministry along with other 
governmental entities.50 Under the madate of Law 1429, this office works 
with firms to help them establish a formal presence in Colombia. 
Programs like Colombia se Formaliza attempt to increase economic 
growth by moving less productive informal firms into the more productive 
formal economy. And while data suggests that informal firms are less 
productive than formal firms, the relationship formalization and economic 
growth appears weak, at best.51 After surveying a number of studies around 
Latin America, Perry and Maloney conclude that the empirical evidence 
suggesting a linkage between formalization and growth is quite limited. “The 
empirical evidence of aggregate negative growth effects of informality is not 
conclusive, as informality tends to lose significance when other standard 
growth determinants are controlled for.”52 Yet they encourage states to 
continue their efforts to reduce regulatory burdens and streamline business 
development, arguing that these could reduce the size of the informal sector. 
But they cautiously suggest that this should not be the only, or even the 
primary approach for states.53 
Consider Mexico, which recently implemented its own program focused 
on disincentivizing informal labor (as opposed to firms).54 The program 
creates a taxpayer-funded pension and health system for all, rather than one 
funded by the state (used by informal workers) and one funded through 
payroll taxes (used by formal workers). The proposal attempts to drive 
informal workers into formal jobs by taking away the barriers to hiring 
formal workers. 
According to The Economist, “[t]he main reason for Mexico’s mediocre 
economic performance (annual growth has averaged just 2.3% since 1982) is 
low productivity. And the most plausible explanation for it is the prevalence 
of a huge informal economy of unregistered and mainly small businesses, in 
 
informalidad-y-la-pobreza-en-el-campo-.html. 
 49  See Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, República de Colombia, Formalizacion 
Empresarial, (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.mincit.gov.co/minindustria/publicaciones.php?id=5308.  
 50  See Colombia se Formaliza (Colombia Formalizes), Quienes Somos (Who we Are), (Mar. 6, 2017), 
http://colombiaseformaliza.com/quienes-somos/.  
 51  SEBASTIAN GALIANI & MARCELA MELENDEZ, LECCIONES A PARTIR DE EXPERIMENTOS DE 
FORMALIZACION EMPRESARIAL (LESSONS FROM BUSINESS FORMALIZATION EXPERIMENTS), INTER-
AMERICAN DEV. BANK (2013). 
 52  See PERRY ET AL., supra note 23, at 175. 
 53  See id., at 176. 
 54  See, e.g., INT’L LAB. ORG., RECENT EXPERIENCES OF FORMALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN (2014); Peña Nieto Presents Plan to Reduce Informal Employment, MEXICO VOICES, July 
23, 2013, http://mexicovoices.blogspot.com/2013/07/mexico-pena-nieto-presents-plan-to.html. 
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which three Mexicans in five work.”55 However, their solution addresses 
only one facet of informality, labor regulations, rather than grappling with 
the larger determinants of informal economic activity, which we discuss 
below. 
 III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
Measuring the informal enterprise economy in any emerging market is 
challenging. The very nature of an informal firm suggests that it would 
attempt to avoid contact with the government if at all possible.56 This makes 
counting the number of informal firms accurately nearly impossible. 
Additionally, firm informality is not a well-defined concept. A number of 
characteristics may make a firm more or less informal (using Colombia as an 
example): 
 
• Failure to register with the proper state agency;57 
 
• [In some cases] Failure to register with the Chamber of Commerce;58 
 
• Failure to subscribe employees to pension and social security 
programs; 
 
• Failure to pay annual taxes;59 and, 
 
• [In cases where required] Failure to pay annual Chamber of 
Commerce dues.60 
 
Most firms comply with some of these requirements. Some firms 
 
 55  Bello, The Reform that Got Away, THE ECONOMIST, May 31, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21603018-mexico-may-pay-high-price-enrique-pe-nietos-
failure-discourage-informal. 
 56  See, e.g., Jane Ihrig & Karine S. Moe, Lurking in the Shadows: The Informal Sector and 
Government Policy, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
pubs/ifdp/2000/664/ifdp664r.pdf. 
 57  This requirement comes from the Registro Unico Tributario (RUT) [Single Tax Registry]. Guia de 
los Servicios del Regristro Unico Tributario, RUT (last updated Jan. 26, 2017), 
http://www.dian.gov.co/contenidos/servicios/rut.html 
 58  Id. 
 59  These taxes are paid to the DIAN, the Colombia tax agency. See KPMG, Colombia: Thinking 
Beyond Borders, KPMG: INSIGHTS (Feb. 28, 2017), https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2014/ 
04/colombia-thinking-beyond-borders.html. 
 60  Pasos para Crear Empresa, CAMARA DE COMERCIO DE BOGOTA, http://www.ccb.org.co/Cree-su-
empresa/Pasos-para-crear-empresa (last visited Aug. 28, 2017). 
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comply with all of them. The majority of firms that fail to comply with one 
or more of these requirements are small firms or micro-enterprises. In 
Colombia, micro-enterprises are evaluated annually by the Colombian 
statistics agency, the DANE. Their annual surveys of micro-enterprises give 
some idea as to the structure of firm informality in Colombia.61 
Of the factors listed above, the best measure of compliance in Colombia 
and the factor used by the DANE to measure overall firm informality is 
registration with the Colombian Chamber of Commerce.62 The Chamber is a 
private institution that functions as the single gatekeeper to legitimate 
business functions in the country.63 Other measures, such as tax identification 
and registration only show one-time acts and not ongoing compliance (since 
a firm only needs to apply for state registration once but they must annually 
renew their Chamber of Commerce membership). 
As discussed later in this paper, data collection on micro-enterprise 
registration in Colombia has proven challenging due to frequent changes in 
methodology by the DANE.64 According to their micro-enterprise survey, 
roughly half of all micro-enterprises operated informally through 2008. 
Following a change in methodology after Law 1429 was implemented in 
2010, the same survey found only a quarter of micro-enterprises operating 
informally.65  This could reflect increased compliance due to the new law, 
but it could also reflect initiatives started by the national chamber of 
commerce or simply a new data collection technique.66 We therefore do not 
find these estimates to be reliable and thus we look to alternative sources for 
more accurate measurements, as discussed later. 
 IV. LITERATURE REVIEW:  AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
EXPLANATION FOR INFORMALITY 
Since its identification by the International Labor Organization in 
1972,67 the informal economy has been a subject of significant interest for 
economics and political science scholars.68 The World Bank released a 
 
 61  Defined as fewer than ten employees. 
 62  See INT’L LAB. ORG., POLICIES FOR THE FORMALIZATION OF MICRO AND SMALL ENTERPRISES IN 
COLOMBIA 4. 
 63  See CONFECAMARAS, http://www.confecamaras.org.co (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
 64  See also Koos von Elk & Jan de Kok, ENTERPRISE FORMALIZATION: FACT OR FICTION? 70 (Int’l 
Lab. Org. Report 2014) (discussing the poor data collection done prior to and following implementation 
of law 1429). 
 65  L. 1429 Dec. 29, 2010 (Colom.). 
 66  See, e.g., von Elk & de Kok, supra note 64, at 70 (offering alternate explanations for increased 
registrations). 
 67  Keith Hart, Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana, 11 J. MODERN 
AFRICAN STUD. (1973). 
 68  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BAJADA & FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER, SIZE, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
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flagship report on the impact of the informal economy on emerging market 
growth in 2007,69 highlighting the critical importance of evaluating 
informality alongside statistics such as tax rates and innovation. And authors 
such as William Perry, Margaret Chen, and Daniel Cordova continue to find 
interest in how the topic relates to business development and investment.70 
This article examines the rationale behind firm informality among 
micro-enterprises using Colombia as the central case study. This literature 
review will assess prior works on enterprise informality as it relates to 
business development and entrepreneurship. Many theories have been 
posited about what the informal economy is, why it is growing, and how to 
eliminate it. In our research, none of these theories sufficiently captures the 
nature of the informal firm and thus none of the approaches to formalization 
seem equipped to regulate those firms. We begin with an examination of the 
central theories of informality. 
 A. The Legalist Approach 
The connection between informality and small business development 
was drawn most prominently by Peruvian scholar Hernando de Soto. In his 
seminal work, The Mystery of Capital, de Soto convincingly argues that 
overly complicated and expensive regulatory frameworks limit the ability 
and willingness of small firms in emerging markets to formally form their 
business (i.e., become “formal”).71 He began mapping the number of steps 
and associated costs for registering a business formally in Peru and found it 
to be exceedingly expensive and time consuming, deterring the majority of 
aspiring entrepreneurs from registering their business with the state. 
In de Soto’s view, a wealth of aspiring entrepreneurs are being 
subjugated to the informal economy due to the state’s inability to streamline 
its regulatory procedures.72 Would-be small firms have no choice but to 
operate in the shadows as gray market firms, substantially limiting their 
ability to grow or be successful. He continued this line of argument in his 
subsequent book, The Other Path, which argued that regulatory streamlining 
would not only improve economic growth, but that it would also reduce the 
likelihood of violence from gangs such as the Shining Path.73 
De Soto’s ideas at the time were trailblazing and opened the door to a 
 
THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY (2005). 
 69  See PERRY ET AL., supra note 23. 
 70  Daniel Cordova, Enhancing Formal and Informal Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries 
Center for International Private Enterprise, http://www.cipe.org/publications/detail/enhancing-formal-
and-informal-entrepreneurship-developing-countries. 
 71  HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (Basic Books, 2000). 
 72  Id. at 102. 
 73  See DE SOTO, supra note 9. 
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number of regulatory reform projects around the world. The World Bank,74 
the Inter-American Development Bank,75 and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development,76 among others, quickly engaged with this theory 
by focusing their projects on regulatory streamlining.77 In addition, 
developing countries began implementing “formalization” programs 
whereby they followed the logic of de Soto in streamlining their regulatory 
processes for new businesses in an effort to encourage more business 
registrations, as we have discussed elsewhere.78 
Institutions, such as the Center for International Private Enterprise 
(CIPE), have also followed the Legalist approach. In a background paper 
written by a CIPE program officer in anticipation of a major informal 
economy workshop, Kuchta-Helbing argued: 
[e]ntrepreneurs of modest means without political influence simply do 
not have the resources or the incentives to comply with costly laws 
and regulations—including obtaining formal property rights, 
acquiring a business permit, or maintaining legal accounting records. 
Locked out of formal, wealth- creating institutions, these 
entrepreneurs operate informally in small-scale, short-term, low-
investment and low surplus-generating activities or they do not engage 
in business at all. This greatly hinders growth.79 
The author went on to suggest that, “poorly designed institutions bar 
entrepreneurs from or discourage their participation in the political and 
economic system. Hence, they operate in the informal sector.”80 
The World Bank’s Norman Loayza has written extensively on the 
causes of informality in Latin America.81 In his more recent work at the 
 
 74  Yaye Sakho, Increasing Formality and Productivity of Bolivian Firms, WORLD BANK (2009). 
 75  Entrepreneurial Strengthening and Formalization to 500 Informal Businesses, INTER-AM. DEVLOP. 
BANK (2008). 
 76  U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., REMOVING BARRIERS TO FORMALIZATION:  THE CASE FOR REFORM 
AND EMERGING BEST PRACTICE (2005). 
 77  Note that informality in Peru, where de Soto conducted his study, surpassed other countries in Latin 
America at the time. See, e.g., NORMAN LOAYZA, CAUSAS Y CONSECUENCIAS DE LA INFORMALIDAD EN 
EL PERÚ (Causes and Consequences of Informality in Peru) (2008). 
 78  See Kevin J. Fandl, Beyond the Invisible: The Impact of Trade Liberalization and Formalization on 
Small Businesses in Colombia  (George Mason University  2010), http://ebot.gmu.edu/bitstream/ 
handle/1920/5800/Dissertation_Kevin_Fandl_2010.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; Juana Paola 
Bustamante, Los retos de la economía informal en Colombia [The Sources of the Informal Economy in 
Colombia], NOTAS FISCALES NO. 9 (2011), http://www.minhacienda.gov.co/portal/page/portal/ 
HomeMinhacienda/politicafiscal/reportesmacroeconomicos/NotasFiscales/Boletin%209%20Los%20 
retos%20de%20la%20economia%20informal%20en%20Colombia.pdf. 
 79  Catherine Kuchta-Helbling, Barriers to Participation: The Informal Sector in Emerging 
Democracies, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE ENTERPRISE (2000). 
 80  Id. 
 81  See Norman Loayza et al., The Impact of Regulation on Growth and Informality: Cross-Country 
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World Bank, Loayza argued that informality arises when states impose 
excessive tax burdens without the institutional mechanisms needed to 
enforce them.82 Again following the tenets of the Legalist approach, he 
maintains the need to focus on regulatory reform to eliminate informal 
business activity. 
Nobel Laureate Douglas North suggests that institutions “form the 
incentive structure of a society” and that these in turn are the foundation for 
economic performance.83 These institutions consist of formal and informal 
constraints along with their enforcement characteristics. Their existence 
determines the transaction costs of starting and operating a business. He 
argues that only when there are no transaction costs are institutions 
unnecessary. Because economic markets are imperfect and include high 
transaction costs, institutions matter. 
Ceyhun Elgin and Oguz Oztunali argue that institutions are particularly 
significant in the context of the informal economy.84  Weak institutional 
environments are more conducive of a more robust and larger informal 
economy. But there are two sides to the institutional analysis of the informal 
economy. First, the perception of a weak state by firms gives the impression 
that the state will be unable to provide adequate and equal benefits for all 
firms that comply with the law.85 This is most obvious with respect to access 
to the judiciary to enforce contracts, enforcement of property rights, or 
effective access to legal remedies. 
Second, a state that lacks effective enforcement mechanisms may 
generate a culture of law avoidance, or illegality.86 Lack of comprehensive 
and fair enforcement mechanisms may lead some individuals to bypass the 
law because the risk of doing so is low. This, in turn, may influence the 
decision of others to do the same, leading to a growing population 
functioning outside the law, as argued by the World Bank.87 Take compliance 
with traffic laws as an example. In many countries, red lights are treated as 
stop signs, especially at night when the risk of being robbed at the stoplight 
is greater than the risk of being caught for ignoring the law.88  With no 
 
Evidence, World Bank (2007), https://www.sba.muohio.edu/davisgk/growth%20readings/14.pdf. 
 82  Id. 
 83  See North, supra note 18. 
 84  Ceyhun Elgin & Oguz Oztunali, INSTITUTIONS, INFORMAL ECONOMY, AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT (2013) (using panel data to conclude that developing countries with strong institutions are 
more effective at reducing informal firm activity during economic growth periods than countries with 
weak institutions). 
 85  See North, supra note 18. 
 86  See Michael Trebilcock & Kevin Davis, The Relationship Between Law and Development:  
Optimists versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. (2008). 
 87  See PERRY ET AL., supra note 23. 
 88  Note that in some cities, red light cameras are deactivated at night to allow drivers to pass red lights 
without fear of infractions. See, e.g., Transit Secretary Resolves New Doubts About the System of Camera 
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significant sign of being caught, and growing distrust in the state, this 
practice has become commonplace and has spread to daytime usage. 
A culture of law avoiders substantially weakens the rule of law, which 
North emphasizes as one of the key elements of economic development. He 
says that long-run economic growth cannot occur in the absence of rule of 
law.89 
De Soto, while a strong advocate of the overbearing regulatory state 
theory, also recognizes the problem of weak institutions. “We can say that 
informal activities burgeon when the legal system imposes rules which 
exceed the socially accepted legal framework – does not honor the 
expectations, choices, and preferences of those whom it does not admit 
within its framework – and when the state does not have sufficient coercive 
authority.”90 However, de Soto perceives the legal barriers to formality as 
arising from the enforcement of laws that deter firms from operating 
formally, rather than from a lack of access to good legal institutions and 
effective enforcement regardless of the state of registration. 
Rule of law in Latin America is generally very weak.91 The perception 
of government enforcement of property rights and of fair and impartial courts 
is lower there than in OECD countries, as well as in many other developing 
country regions.92 Distrust in the state has given rise to a culture of law 
avoiders that find it beneficial, and often lucrative, to operate otherwise 
legitimate business endeavors outside the regulatory purview of the state. 
Avoidance of tax and business registration laws is further influenced by 
the law enforcement environment.93 When the risk of law enforcement is low, 
and the perceived benefit of paying taxes and regulatory fees is also low, 
there may be a higher incidence of avoidance.94 Yet rather than simply a 
matter of weak deterrence, several authors comment that it is the broader 
exchange of taxes for benefits that leads some countries’ citizens to comply 
with the law while others do not, despite similar levels of enforcement.95 
Perry and Maloney convincingly argue that state taxation can be conceived 
 
Fines in Cali, Colombia, EL PAIS, Jan. 10, 2013 (explaining that, due to the risk of crime, traffic cameras 
are turned off in the late evenings), http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/cali/noticias/secretario-transito-
resuelve-dudas-sobre-sistemas-fotomultas-cali. 
 89  See North, supra note 18. 
 90  See DE SOTO, supra note 9. 
 91  See MARK UNGAR, ELUSIVE REFORM: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA 
(2001). 
 92  See PERRY ET AL., supra note 23. 
 93  MARCELO BERGMAN, TAX EVASION AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
CULTURE OF CHEATING AND COMPLIANCE IN ARGENTINA AND CHILE (2009). 
 94  See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much do we Really Know about Criminal Deterrence?, 3 J. 
OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 765, 768 (2010) (discussing commentary that there is an increased 
willingness to avoid compliance in the absence of a strong perceived risk of being caught). 
 95  See PERRY ET AL., supra note 23. 
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of as a contract between the state and its citizens, and that when the citizens 
do not perceive that the state is upholding their performance obligations, 
there is little desire for the citizen to do so either.96 
The role of institutions in sustaining informal economic activity has not 
been extensively addressed by the literature, yet appears to play a significant, 
perhaps even a central role. Economic factors no doubt also play an important 
role in driving firms into and out of informality, but institutions form the 
framework in which ultimate cost–benefit decisions are made. Within the 
institutional framework, rule of law may be the most significant factor in 
facilitating an environment that welcomes, and perhaps even encouraging 
informality. 
Despite widespread support for the Legalist theory that regulatory 
barriers are holding back aspiring entrepreneurs, other scholars have found 
that informality is in fact more related to issues such as access to finance and 
related resources. And in many cases, these “entrepreneurs” are nothing more 
than survivalists attempting to find income in a limited opportunity job 
market. This brings us to the Dualist approach. 
 B. The Dualist Approach 
The Dualist approach is largely associated with authors such as Victor 
Tokman of the International Labor Organization, Dartmouth’s Rafael La 
Porta, and Harvard’s Andrei Schleifer. This approach contends that the 
informality firms engage in is not entrepreneurial at all. Rather, informal 
firms are merely survivalist in nature, getting by on minimal profit margins 
acquired from their avoidance of regulatory burdens.97 In effect, this 
approach implies that informality is a choice made in the interest of economic 
gain, or perhaps because no other viable options remain for gainful 
employment. 
La Porta and Schleifer, well-known for their controversial work on the 
effects of legal origins on economic development,98 characterize de Soto’s 
approach to informality as hopeful but unrealistic. In their view, reducing the 
 
 96  See PERRY ET AL., supra note 23, at 239–40. 
 97  Christian M. Rogerson, Emerging from Apartheid’s Shadow: South Africa’s Informal Economy, 53 
J. INT’L AFF. (2000)(arguing that informal firms are not micro-enterprises but rather survivalist entities 
seeking day-to-day sustainability). 
 98  A highly influential article on legal origins and economic development was published by Rafael La 
Porta, Florensio Lopex-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, which found that countries 
employing or deriving from a common law system grow faster than those with a civil law system. “Any 
inquiry into policy implications has to go beyond regression results to the underlying mechanisms through 
which the law, the judiciary, and the legal profession influence the economy.” Kenneth W. Dam, Legal 
Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance 13 (John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 
303, 2006); see also Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Rafael La Porta, & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. (2007). 
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barriers to doing business, while always a productive avenue for economic 
growth, has little to do with reducing informality. Informal firms are vastly 
different from formal firms because they operate on a much smaller, less 
productive scale and are driven by uneducated, less savvy managers.99 Their 
approach draws a clear line between formal and informal firms and makes no 
secret of the contention that programs such as formalization are a waste of 
resources.100 In their view, informal firms are not entrepreneurs, nor are they 
prevented from formalizing by a complex legal regime. Rather, they are 
survivalist firms in need of basic social services from the state to prevent 
them from slipping deeper into poverty. In their view, the remedy for 
informality is expansion of the formal sector through productivity incentives 
such as improved tax regimes, human capital development, and 
infrastructure. In other words, job creation should lead to a reduction in the 
number of individuals resorting to informality. 
Moving even further away from the entrepreneurial view, La Porta and 
Schleifer define the informal economy as a “manifestation of 
underdevelopment.”101 The results of their survey analysis show that 
informality is closely linked with GDP per capita—more poverty leads to 
more informality. They call this the “dual view” and suggest that the best 
approach to ridding a country of informality is to develop more formality by 
focusing resources on micro-enterprise development. 
La Porta and Shleifer’s most recent paper on informality contends not 
only that these firms are small and unproductive, but also that they are 
disconnected from the formal economy and rarely transition to the formal 
economy.102  This view coincides with the idea that capitalism will ultimately 
open new opportunities in the formal sector for these workers and they will 
then abandon their posts at informal firms. In their view, economic 
development will automatically dissolve the informal economy. 
Tokman initially identified informality as another name for the 
“working poor,” surviving on basic trade in the absence of employment 
opportunities.103 In his later work, he argued that informality resulted from 
excessive labor supply and inadequate job opportunities due to the 
decentralization of productive activities. And in his most recent paper on this 
topic, he adopted the more Structuralist ideas of Alejandro Portes and others 
in arguing that globalization has played a role in dividing labor between more 
and less productive contributing members of the marketplace. In this work, 
unlike his former colleagues in the Dualist school, Tokman argues that 
 
 99  See La Porta & Shleifer, supra note 37. 
 100  See id., at 118. 
 101  See La Porta & Shleifer, supra note 12, at 292. 
 102  See generally La Porta & Shleifer, supra note 37. 
 103  Victor Tokman, Modernizing the Informal Sector, 1 (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Working Paper No. 42, 2007). 
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formalization programs should address productivity through training and 
access to credit. Tokman argues that “[i]nformal activities are not caused by 
regulatory inadequacies but rather by the failure of the economic system to 
create enough productive employment.”104 This brings us into the most recent 
theory attempting to rationalize informality, the Structuralist Approach. 
 C. The Structuralist Approach 
A competing view can be found in the Structuralist school of thought, 
embraced by Princeton sociologist Alejandro Portes,105 Friedrich 
Schneider,106 and World Bank economists Ian Perry and William Maloney,107 
among others. This view perceives informality as the result of the economic 
environment rather than the legal environment. For these authors, 
streamlining the regulatory system will not provide the necessary incentives 
for most informal firms to transition to formality. An unproductive firm will 
remain unproductive whether it has easy access to regularization or not. 
This approach tends to see capitalist development as the creator of 
informality, with formal firms subjugating informal workers and small 
enterprises to maintain competitiveness through low labor and capital costs. 
In their description of the structuralist school, Alejandro Portes and Richard 
Schauffler explain how their approach differs from the Legalist approach. 
They contend that de Soto’s recommendation to remove the regulatory 
barriers to operating a business would not only have little positive impact on 
informality, but that it may destroy the capitalist system itself. In the view of 
Portes and Schauffler, “[i]nstead of the Trojan Horse that will ultimately 
break down the fortress of ‘mercantilist’ privilege, the informal sector in fact 
represents part of the routine operation of capitalism as it is presently 
organized in Latin America.”108 Accordingly, their solution focuses on 
enhancing the relationships between formal and informal enterprise through 
capital investments in modern industrial and service sectors. 
Going even further, Portes challenged the Dualist idea that informality 
will dissipate with capitalist development. He argued that it was the 
movement toward rapid industrialization and regulatory liberalization that 
contributed to a growing informal economy in the first place, as small 
enterprises were pushed away from participation in an economy geared 
toward industry and export, while larger enterprises became dependent on 
 
 104  See Tokman, supra note 103, at 4. 
 105  See Portes, supra note 11. 
 106  See Schneider, supra note 43. 
 107  William Maloney, Informality Revisited, 32 WORLD DEV. 1159 (2004). 
 108  Alejandro Portes & Richard Schauffler, Competing Perspectives on the Latin American Informal 
Sector, 19 POP. & DEV. REV. 33, 47 (1993). 
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the inputs of small, informal firms.109 
Taking a more nuanced view, World Bank economists Ian Perry and 
William Maloney authored a major study on informality in 2007 in which 
they argued that informality is reflective of a larger problem of unproductive 
firms. Their report suggested that productivity should be at the center of the 
effort to reduce informality: “formality can be seen as an input in the 
production process for which small firms have little need.”110 At early stages 
of development, profitability, although not necessarily productivity, requires 
avoidance of state regulations in order to maintain sustainable income. 
Complying with the law would require the firm to divulge the majority, if not 
the totality, of their earnings. 
Maloney distinguishes the Structuralist approach from the Dualist 
approach by arguing that, “we should think of the informal sector as the 
unregulated, developing country analogue of the voluntary entrepreneurial 
small firm sector found in advanced countries, rather than as a residual 
comprised of disadvantaged workers rationed out of good jobs.”111 Likewise, 
in a report by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the authors 
conclude that informal economic activity is a major contributor to the overall 
national economy and not distinct from it.112 
Perry and Maloney contend that informal firms, while unproductive 
themselves, also impact the productivity of the broader economy.113 In the 
broader economy, informal firms tend to restrict the operation of the 
capitalist doctrine of creative destruction, allowing new firms to rise up to 
seize new market opportunities. Also, high levels of informality may restrict 
the willingness of formal firms to adopt new technology or innovative 
techniques that could be improperly requisitioned by informal firms.114 
For Perry and Maloney, the informal economy may be standing in the 
way of the creative destruction process by allowing small, unproductive 
firms to compete with small, formal firms that face higher operating costs.115 
But in exchange for those higher operating costs, the formal firms may have 
the ability to grow into productive, innovative firms. The informal economy, 
then, holds back potentially innovative formal firms. Of course, this 
argument fails to take into account the cross-breeding between the formal 
and informal sectors that may allow small registered firms to take advantage 
of low cost inputs, marketing, labor, and distribution of their goods or 
 
 109  ALEJANDRO PORTES ET AL., THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1989). 
 110  See PERRY ET AL., supra note 23. 
 111  See Maloney, supra note 107. 
 112  Ihrig & Moe, supra note 56, at 2. 
 113  PERRY ET AL., supra note 23, at 171 (explaining the effects of informality on productivity). 
 114  Id. at 170. 
 115  Id. at 173. 
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services via the informal economy. So, while informal firms may undercut 
the potential of a formal firm to rapidly accelerate to profitability, they may 
also facilitate that development through lower cost labor and supplies. 
Innovation and technology can help a firm become more productive by 
increasing efficiency and output without increasing labor input. As informal 
firms are associated with the theft of technology through piracy and reverse 
engineering, formal firms are hesitant to engage in extensive innovation or 
investments in technology.116 This withdrawal from innovative practices can 
reduce the productivity potential of a formal firm and limit overall economic 
growth. 
Informal firms are also limited in the application of technology and 
innovation to their own operations. With little capital to invest and little skill 
to apply, an informal firm often resorts to outdated production techniques 
and devices to run their business. In many developing countries, this is visible 
among street traders and marketplaces where even basic goods such as 
electricity and clean water are lacking. 
The structuralist views of Perry, Maloney, and similar authors offer a 
more expansive view of informality than the Legalist view by focusing on 
increasing productivity through a variety of means, not simply regulatory 
streamlining.117 This perspective sees informality as a rational choice by the 
firm, which is attempting to capitalize on its extralegal operations. In order 
to incentivize firms from this approach, Perry suggests administrative and tax 
simplification procedures, eliminating anachronistic or privately motivated 
laws, and enhancing enforcement. This view perceives barriers to 
formalization within the formal legal structure of the state and implies that if 
these barriers are lowered, more firms will be incentivized to become formal. 
 D. Concluding Remarks on Existing Literature 
Enterprise informality is not a homogenous concept. Just as Harvard 
scholar Martha Chen described labor informality as existing on a sliding 
scale, firm informality similarly occupies distinct categories based upon the 
firm’s relationship with the state.118 De Soto’s approach suggests that all 
firms are interested in formalizing and capable of surviving in the regulated 
marketplace. Dualism suggests that no informal firms would survive in the 
formal economy and that they should be largely ignored by the state. The 
 
 116  See, e.g., Kevin J. Fandl, Theft of Foreign Owned Intellectual Property in Latin America: A New 
Strategy 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 299 (2016). 
 117  Joseph L. Love, The Rise and Decline of Structuralism in Latin America: New Dimensions, 40 
LATIN AM. RESEARCH REV. 100 (2005). 
 118  Martha Chen, Rethinking the Informal Economy:  Linkages with the Formal Economy and the 
Formal Regulatory Environment, 1 (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Working Paper No. 46, 
2007). 
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Structuralist approach falls between the two extremes, positioning informal 
firms as an essential part of the capitalist value chain but an unproductive 
one, unlikely to survive the burden of a regulated marketplace. 
Many informal firms in Latin America are survivalist firms, operating 
at or below the poverty line and succeeding because of evasion of the state’s 
regulatory system.119 However, a substantial number of firms evidence an 
interest in growing and becoming productive enterprises. These are the firms 
that de Soto referred to as being held back by the regulatory system; however, 
we suggest here that his justification for their informality was misplaced. 
Rather than regulatory barriers, we contend that these would-be 
entrepreneurial firms have limited reasons for formalizing because of the lack 
of benefits offered by the state to these firms. 
The process of formalization requires a firm to register with a state body 
and subject itself to labor, health, safety, and other business-oriented 
regulations. In exchange, the firm would typically receive valuable benefits, 
such as access to credit, participation in a network of like-minded businesses, 
and the ability to participate in formal supply chains occupied by formal 
enterprises. In addition, these firms would avoid the regulatory enforcement 
mechanisms of the state that might levy fines or other penalties on non-
compliant firms. 
In many developing countries, the benefits of formalization and the risk 
of regulatory enforcement are limited, substantially weakening the incentive 
to formalize. Nevertheless, developing countries in Latin America, especially 
those with strong capitalist markets, have sought to bring these informal 
firms into the regulated marketplace. These efforts are known as 
formalization programs. 
 E. The Formalization Incentive 
States are motivated to formalize their informal firms for a number of 
reasons, but principally for those discussed above—increased productivity, 
compliance with laws and regulations, and the creation of a more attractive 
investment climate. By luring more firms into the formal marketplace, a state 
may be able to work toward these goals. This approach has been encouraged 
by major institutions, including the World Bank in its annual Doing Business 
reports.120 
The negative elements of informality are widely acknowledged by 
economists. Schneider summarizes the downside of informality as yielding 
lower tax revenue for the state; distorting economic and social data that could 
 
 119  See Fandl, supra note 78. 
 120  See, e.g., Miguel Jaramillo, Is There Demand for Formality Among Informal Firms 1 (Ger. Dev. 
Inst., Discussion Paper 2009) (relying on the idea that informal firms have entrepreneurial capabilities). 
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affect the distribution of state benefits; lowering tax morality, which is highly 
associated with rule of law; creating unfair competition with the formal 
economy; increasing dependence on welfare programs; reducing efficiency 
in production; leading to unregulated business activities that could put 
consumers at risk; and potentially worsening inequality.121 His global survey 
yields few observable positive benefits of maintaining a large informal 
economy, other than basic employment at the subsistence wage. As a result, 
regularizing these firms through formalization programs has gained 
widespread acceptance. 
But is formalization necessary? Historically, informal firms have 
provided some economic benefits for emerging markets.122 For instance, 
these firms are flexible and adaptable enough to quickly meet changing 
demands for products and services that might not otherwise be possible by 
highly regulated formal firms. Additionally, informal firm owners might 
otherwise be unemployed and depend on the state for support through 
unemployment insurance, healthcare, and pensions.123 
Perhaps even more importantly, demand for formalization among many 
informal firms may be much lower than expected. Consider a recent 
experiment conducted in Peru, which offered to pay the costs of 
formalization and guide informal firms through the process.124 Only 25% of 
the surveyed firms accepted the offer and many of those that did failed to 
complete the process. After surveying a sample of informal firms about why 
they did not formalize, the majority complained that the process to do so was 
too lengthy and expensive.125 When questioned about the benefits of 
formalization, firms consistently reported that it was beneficial to avoid fines 
and bribes. Yet when asked about the risks of formalizing, the pricipal 
concerns were ongoing costs, such as inspections and taxes.126  The author of 
the study concluded that most informal firms see few benefits and some 
serious drawbacks to formalizing, even when the costs of doing so are 
reduced.127 
It appears to have been understood by developing countries that 
informal business serves a necessary purpose along their economic growth 
path. Yet as global markets have become more competetive and expanded 
into the territory of these emerging markets, demand from within and without 
for more productive and fair business practices has grown. 
 
 121  See Bajada, supra note 68. 
 122  Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar, Informal Economy: Is it a Problem, a Solution, or Both? The Perspective 
of the Informal Business, NW. U. L. & ECON. PAPERS (Paper 1, 2006). 
 123  Id. at 11–12. 
 124  See Jaramillo, supra note 120. 
 125  See Garcia-Bolivar, supra note 123, at 17. 
 126  See id. at 9. 
 127  See id. at 15–16. 
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Accordingly, many developing states that intend to become integrated 
into the global marketplace have taken on efforts to address informality.128  
Each country approaches the informal economy differently—some focusing 
more heavily on social programs to protect workers, others adding resources 
to enforcement of registration laws—but most have begun the process of 
formalization in one way or another.129 
Formalization is viewed by many states and international organizations 
as a pathway to economic growth. Accordingly, in addition to extensive 
studies on the benefits of formalization,130 investments by international 
development organizations to support formalization programs have been 
prominent. In the past several years, the Inter-American Development Bank 
has provided several formalization project loans to countries in Latin 
America.131 Many of these have focused on efforts in Colombia.132 In a 2013 
retrospective review of their work in the area of formalization, the Bank 
concluded that their efforts had little effect on the actual formalization of 
firms nor their access to credit; however, the projects did result in improved 
operating income and assets.133 
All major formalization programs in Latin America share a common 
theory—that large informal economies are bad for business and should be 
formalized. This is evident through the reports and recommendations of the 
 
 128  See id. at 7–8. 
 129  See, e.g., Formalización Empresarial, Ministerio de la Producción de Perú, Formalización 
Empreserial de Peru (Business Formalization in Peru), 
http://www.miempresa.gob.pe/portal/images/stories/ 
files/pdf/gestionando-mi-empresa/formalizacion.pdf (last visited: 3/10/17); Formalización Empresarial, 
Mincomercio Industria Y Turismo de Colombia, Formalizacio Empreserial de Colombia (Business 
Formalization of Colombia), http://www.mincit.gov.co/minindustria/publicaciones.php?id=5308 (last 
visited 3/10/17). 
 130  See, e.g., PERRY ET AL., supra note 23. 
 131  See, e.g., Support of Employment Formalization Initiatives, Inter-Am. Develop. Bank Report ME-
T1278 (2015) (providing $350,000 to support employment formalization in Mexico); Report BO-M1012, 
Support of Micro and Small Enterprise Formalization in Bolivia (2005) (providing $138,090 to support 
the formalization of small firms in Cochabamba, Bolivia); BR-M1019, Formalization of Tourism Micro-
enterprises in Brazil (2004) (providing $93,740 to support the informal tourism sector in Serra Grande, 
Brazil). 
 132  See, e.g., Inter-Am. Develop. Bank Report CO-M1044, Firm Formalization and Strengthening of 
500 Informal Micro-enterprises (2008) (providing $288, 992 to help identify informal firms in the Cauca 
region of Colombia), http://www.iadb.org/es/proyectos/project-information-page,1303.html?id=co-
m1044; Report CO-M1059, National Firm Formalization Development Program (2011) (providing $2.6 
million to facilitate broad-based formalization of small firms around Colombia), 
http://www.iadb.org/es/proyectos/project-information-page,1303.html?id=co-m1059. 
 133  Inter-Am. Develop. Bank, Lecciones a partir de experimentos de formalización empresarial 
[Lessons from Business Formalization Experiments] (2013), http://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/ 
4586?locale-attribute=es#sthash.G6OFt0mA.dpuf. 
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World Bank134 and the Inter-American Development Bank.135 In his seminal 
work, The Other Path, de Soto argues that regulatory barriers such as 
excessive taxation and bureaucratic red tape are the barriers holding back 
natural formalization.136 
In particular, de Soto focused on the state requirements to form a 
business and register property. He argued that excessive regulation creates 
costs and time inefficiencies that make it more burdensome to register a 
business and pay taxes than to remain informal. De Soto’s work formed the 
basis of the World Bank’s Doing Business report, which surveys countries 
based upon their regulatory systems, among other things, and categorizes 
them based on the ease of doing business in the country.137 
Despite many critiques of his theory,138 including by authors of World 
Bank and Inter-American Development Bank Reports,139 de Soto continues 
to hold sway over development institutions and, through their work, over 
developing countries. Though his position is not officially adopted by these 
institutions, his approach to formalization—promoting entrepreneurship by 
reducing the burdens of doing business—has informed projects throughout 
the region.140 
 V. CASE STUDY:  COLOMBIA’S FORMALIZATION LAW 
According to the 2014 Doing Business Report, Colombia ranks as one 
of the most streamlined countries to do business in (see Figure 1).141  The 
2015 report indicates that Colombia has dramatically improved its business 
environment. However, it is worth noting that the vast majority of “points” 
 
 134  See PERRY ET AL., supra note 23, at 1. 
 135  Lessons Learned:  Business Registration Made Simple Project Documents Stories of Change,  
INTER-AM. DEVELOP. BANK, http://www.iadb.org/mif/lessons/lessonlearned.cfm?lesson=3&tab=1& 
Language=English&parid=4. 
 136  See de Soto, supra note 9; but see Rafael La Porta and Andei Shleifer, The Unofficial Economy 
and Economic Development, TUCK SCHOOL OF BUSINESS WORKING PAPER (2009) (critiquing de Soto’s 
approach and suggesting that his view is overly “romantic”). 
 137  See, e.g., WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS (2015). 
 138  See, e.g., David McKenzie, Was de Soto wrong? Impacts of a formalization experiment in Sri 
Lanka, WORLD BANK (2012) (arguing that an experiment conducted in Sri Lanka to formalize small firms 
demonstrated little demand for formalization among informal firms); John Gravois, The De Soto Delusion, 
SLATE.COM, 2005, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/hey_wait_a_minute/ 
2005/01/the_de_soto_delusion.html (suggesting that de Soto’s vision was appealing, but likely incorrect). 
 139  See, e.g., Francisco Mejia, Informal Sector: Hidden Capital or Vampire?, INTER-AM. DEVELOP. 
BANK, 2014. 
 140  See Report, supra note 131 (identifying numerous projects in the region focuses on formalization 
with the goal of improving entrepreneurial activity). 
 141  See WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS (2013): Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size 
Enterprises (dedicating a chapter to discuss Colombia’s success in streamlining business regulations and 
improving foreign investment). 
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that Colombia received allowing it to rise in the rankings was due to 
improvement in access to credit. That factor improved because of 
Colombia’s efforts to enhance protections for secured creditors by creating a 
collateral registry and setting forth rules for prioritizing secured creditors in 
bankruptcy proceedings.142 
 
Figure 1. World Bank Doing Business in Colombia 2015 Report. 
Source:  World Bank. 
 
Firm informality remains exceedingly high in Colombia, despite 
compliance with the recommendations of de Soto and the World Bank, 
making it an excellent chocie for a case study on the success of formalization 
programs.143 Despite the apparent disconnect between reducing regulatory 
burdens and increasing formalization, countries continue down this path to 
improve business. Through our analysis of the latest efforts to do so in one 
emerging economy, we hope to highlight the fault in this approach. 
The World Bank ranks Colombia 34th in ease of doing business, well 
above other Latin American countries and similarly situated developing 
countries.144  In addition, opening a business in the country’s capital city, 
Bogotá, is a relatively straightforward process, requiring only four steps.145  
The steps for doing so are listed in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2. Registering a business in Bogota. 
 
 142  In particular, the World Bank notes that “Colombia improved access to credit by adopting a new 
secured transactions law that establishes a functional secured transactions system and a centralized, 
notice-based collateral registry. The law broadens the range of assets that can be used as collateral, allows 
a general description of assets granted as collateral, establishes clear priority rules inside bankruptcy for 
secured creditors, sets out grounds for relief from a stay of enforcement actions by secured creditors during 
reorganization procedures and allows out-of-court enforcement of collateral.” WORLD BANK, BUSINESS 
REFORMS IN COLOMBIA, http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reforms/Overview/Economy/ 
colombia.  
 143  See INT’L LAB. ORG., supra note at 4. 
 144  See WORLD BANK, supra note 143.  
 145  See id. 
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Colombia has not always offered a friendly business environment. The 
costs associated with starting a business in Colombia hovered around 25% of 
an individual’s annual income only ten years ago.146  Today, the costs are 
below 10%, as noted in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3. Cost to start a business in Colombia. Source:  Author’s 
calculations based upon data from the World Bank. 
 








2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Cost (% of income) to start a 
business in Colombia (2004-2015)
Register with the 
Colombian Chamber of 
Commerce 
Obtain a tax identification 
number from the DIAN 
Register the company with 
several social service 
agencies 
Register employees for 
pensions, health 
insurance, and a 
severance fund 
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 A. Legislative History 
When the Colombian government promulgated Law 1429, Colombia 
was facing high levels of unemployment and informality. In 2009 the average 
official unemployment rate in Colombia was 12% at the national level 
(slightly higher in some cities). However, about 61% of the working 
population was excluded from the social security system according to the 
PILA147 and RUA,148 indicating that more than half of the population were 
working in unregulated businesses as sole proprietors.149 And despite high 
and sustained economic growth since that time, these rates had not declined. 
Over half of the population works without job security, without 
reasonable living wages, and is likely on the road to worsening poverty. And 
nearly every small firm lacks access to protection from the state, including 
reasonable access to the courts, property right protection, and state finance. 
According to some authors, this fact represents one of the greatest challenges 
to the development of the country.150 
The growth of the informal sector in Colombia may be partially linked 
to the rapid growth of the nation’s urban areas, a result of mass migration and 
displacement of workers in rural areas by rebel fighters (guerillas).151 
Conditions which contribute to increased migration “ha[ve] a large impact 
on the probability of being employed in the informal sector.”152 A significant 
contingent of informal workers in Colombian cities were displaced by 
guerilla activity in their hometowns. Additionally, the informal economy 
grew due to a decline in the demand for labor during the economic downturn 
of the 1990s, with workers turning to independent firms to generate survival 
income.153 
 B. Law 1429:  The Formalization Law 
Colombia passed Law 1429 in December of 2010.154  Also known as the 
Law of Formalization and Employment Generation, the law attempts to 
promote business and employment formalization throughout the cycle of 
 
 147  Comprehensive Form of Liquidation of Contributions, Ministry of Social Protection. 
 148  Register of Contributors, Ministry of Finance. 
 149  See also, Sebastian Galiani & Marcela Melendez, Lecciones a Partir de Experimentos de 
Formalizacion Empresarial (Lessons from Business Formalization Experiments) (2013) (finding that 59% 
of informal firms in Colombia were operated as sole proprietorships). 
 150  See, e.g., Francisco E. Thoumi, Some Implications of the Growth of the Underground Economy in 
Colombia, 29 J. INTER-AM. STUDIES & WORLD AFF. 35–37 (1987). 
 151  Carmen Elisa Flórez, Migration and the Urban Informal Sector in Colombia, Paper prepared for 
Conference on African Migration in Comparative Perspective, Johannesburg, South Africa (June 2003). 
 152  Id. at 2. 
 153  Id. at 6. 
 154  L. 1429 Dec. 29, 2010 (Colom.). 
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existence of firms. The law takes an incremental approach to formalization 
by easing new small businesses that might otherwise operate in the informal 
sector into the formal registration process and providing them with tax 
incentives for generating new formal employment, among other things. 
Micro-enterprise promotion is an important goal of the formalization 
process. Micro-enterprises constitute the bulk of economic activity in most 
developing countries.155  And for a micro-enterprise to succeed, it must be 
able to operate productively, generating net profits while complying with the 
law. However, most of the micro-enterprises in the informal economy are 
unable to generate profits if they comply with the law. As a result, they 
choose to operate outside the law. 
Law 1429 was intended to motivate these small businesses to formalize 
and generate productive employment, since 67% of dependent employment 
or wage income in Colombia is generated by these businesses.156 
Additionally, informality is heavily concentrated in these smaller, less 
detectable businesses. At the time the law passed in 2010, business 
informality (defined as either failure to obtain commercial registration or 
failure to pay taxes) was around 36% in companies with ten or fewer 
employees while this percentage is around 7% for companies with more than 
ten employees.157 
The formalization law targets three main causes of informality: 1) firm 
informality resulting from registration burdens; 2) firm informality resulting 
from tax burdens; and 3) labor informality. The law is thus structured to 
provide incentives intended to overcome each of these. Each of these is 
outlined below. 
 C. TARGET 1:  Formalization of Newly Registered Firms:  
Registration and Taxes 
 1. Registration Incentives 
Law 1429 offers incentives for the creation of new small formal 
enterprises, defining formality as registration with the Chamber of 
Commerce, by reducing the cost of registration. The aim is to reduce the 
administrative costs of formalizing new and existing enterprises. The law 
creates a progressive payment scheme for commercial registration and 
renewals (until December 31, 2014) for new enterprises with fewer than 50 
employees and less than 5,000 minimum salaries in assets (approximately 
 
 155  See, e.g., Khrystyna Kushnir et al., Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises, WORLD BANK (2010), 
https://smefinanceforum.org/sites/default/files/analysis_note_2010.pdf. 
 156  See INT’L LAB. ORG., supra note 61 at 5–6. 
 157  Departamento Nacional de Planeación (Colombia) [Colombian National Department of Planning]. 
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Figure 4. Progressive New Firm Registration Fees with the Chamber of 
Commerce. 
  
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
0% 50% 75% 100% 
 
Figure 5. Progressive Existing Firm Registration Fees with the Chamber 
of Commerce. 
 
Years before 2008 2008 2009 2010 2011 
0% 50% 50% 100% 100% 
 
This incentivizes re-registration for firms that registered and then 
dropped their renewals because they did not need it. Existing firms that were 
formerly out of compliance receive a discount on back fees for 
registrations.159 These firms accounted for the majority of those taking 
advantage of registration under Law 1429.160 
 2. Simplification of Formalization Procedures 
In order to encourage formal registration of a firm, the law substantially 
simplifies existing registration procedures. It establishes a set of rules and 
amendments to the Labor Code, Law 1116 of 2006 (Corporate Insolvency 
Regime) and other regulations, in order to simplify and reduce labor, 
commercial, and administrative procedures, including:161 
 
• Simplification of business procedures in the substantive Labor Code 
 
• Simplification of commercial procedures 
 
 
 158  The Colombian minimum monthly wage in 2014 is COL$616,000 = US$327. 
 159  See von Elk & Kok, supra note 64, at 70 (finding that 87,043 existing firms re-registered under 
Law 1429). 
 160  See La Ley 1429 de 2010 ha Formalizado el Empleo en Colombia? (Did Law 1429 of 2010 
Formalize Employment in Colombia?), Observational Market Bulletin of Work and Social Security No. 
13 (2012), Universidad Externado de Colombia, at 27–28. 
 161  L. 1116 of 2006 [Colombia]. 
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• Control mechanisms and other provisions 
 
The law also created the National Information System, which consists 
of representatives from several Ministries and has the aim of consolidating 
and processing information found on job applications, including features and 
specifications of occupations in both the public and private sectors at national 
and local levels. It creates the Bulletin of Unsatisfied Labor Demand, which 
is an informational document containing a detailed list of jobs that have high 
levels of unsatisfied demand in particular regions of the country. 
 3. Income Tax Incentives for New Firms 
The law is intended to promote fiscal formalization of new small 
businesses by offering progressive reductions in the payment of income 
tax.162 This contributes to the reduction in initial operating costs for the firm’s 
initial period of existence. Progressive increases in income tax rates are 
applied to new firms with fewer than 50 employees and less than five 
thousand minimum salaries.163 
 
Figure 6. Progressive Income Tax Payment Schedule for New Firms. 
 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
0% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
 
 D. TARGET 2:  Formalization of the Labor Market 
Both formal and informal firms may employ unreported labor.164 These 
workers face significant risks when they function informally, including lack 
of pension accrual, lack of health care, and lack of predictable employment. 
Thus, the Formalization Law also seeks to reduce the risks associated with 
informal labor.165 
To do so, the law works to encourage more formal labor contracts for 
new small businesses by reducing the costs of payroll contributions for all 
formal employees. The aim is to help in a progressive way to reduce the costs 
associated with formal employment (until December 31, 2014). The law 
 
 162  See, e.g., id., at Art. 85 (explaining the intent to establish a tax base and reduce red tape to 
encourage the registration of informal enterprises). 
 163  Not applicable to withholding tax or presumptive income system (until December 31, 2014). 
 164  See World Bank, supra note 26, at 69. 
 165  See INT’L LAB. ORG., supra note 61 at 8–9.  
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implements a progressive system whereby social security payments will 
increase incrementally for new enterprises with fewer than 50 employees and 
less than 5,000 minimum salaries in asset value. 
 
Figure 7 shows the type of social security contributions subject to the 
progressive reduction established by the law. Each of these refers to a distinct 
social program implemented by the state to protect workers and their 
families. 
 
Figure 7. Social Security Contributions Required from all Firms.166 
 
CCF ICBF SENA FOSYGA 
4% 3% 2% 1.5% 
 
Figure 8 shows the progressive increases for the payment of social 
security contributions. 
 
Figure 8. Progressive Discount on Social Security Payments for New 
Firms. 
 
Year 1  Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6  
0% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
 
 E. TARGET 3:  Youth and female employment. 
The formalization law targets not only new small firms, but also young 
entrepreneurs.167 Unemployment rates for workers under the age of 30 in 
2009 were around 20%, while the rate for those over 30 was around 10%. 
This is why it is important to implement policies aimed at increasing formal 
employment, with social security and economic benefits, for the young 
population. 
 
 166  These abbreviations are explained as follows. CCF: Caja de Compensación Familiar. ICBF: 
Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar. SENA: Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje. FOSYGA: Fondo 
de Solidaridad y Garantía del Sistema General de Seguridad en Salud de Colombia. 
 167  See INT’L LAB. ORG., supra note 61 at 9–10. 
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 1. Young Entrepreneur Incentives 
In order to incentivize the creation of new formal enterprises, the 
provisions of this regulation are aimed at directing the efforts of the programs 
of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism to target beneficiaries 
referred to by Law 1429, especially those under 28 years old.168 
 
• Design and promote programs of micro credit oriented to businesses 
created by people under age 28; 
 
• Programs or technical and financial support to formalize the rural 
sector and business, employment generation; 
 
• Strengthen relationships between enterprises, State and University: 
joint committee on labor and business formalization; and, 
 
• Improve youth employability through the design of programs that 
offer tools to people in exclusion situation.169 
 
To encourage more formal hiring of young workers and women over 40 
years of age, the law provides employers with a discount on the income tax 
paid for social security contributions for these employees.170 The goal of this 
element of the law is to encourage the creation of new formal jobs in 
established companies that hire people from targeted populations. To be 
eligible, the new jobs must be given to members of these vulnerable groups—
youth and women over 40 who earn less than 1.5 minimum wages 
(approximately US$490.). 
 VI. IS THE LAW WORKING? 
Our analysis of Law 1429 suggests that it has not successfully achieved 
its goal of substantially reducing firm informality in Colombia. The goal of 
any enterprise formalization program is to increase firm compliance with the 
legal and regulatory structure of the state. Accordingly, the best measure of 
whether a formalization law is working is to assess the number of firms in 
compliance before and after the law was passed.171 This includes compliance 
 
 168  L. 1429 Dec. 29, 2010 (Colom.). 
 169  Id.; see also INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK MULTILATERAL INV. FUND, COLOMBIA: REVITALIZING 
AND STRENGTHENING ENTRPRENEURSHIP AMONG LOW-INCOME YOUTH, 
https://ews.rightsindevelopment.org/files/documents/00/IADB-CO-M1100.pdf. 
 170  See INT’L LAB. ORG., supra note 61 at 10. 
 171  See, e.g., Externado, supra note 160, at 27 (explaining that the best measure of the effects of the 
law would be to examine the number of firms that registered directly as a result of the law and stayed 
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with tax laws, business registration laws, and general labor laws. And though 
elimination of the informal enterprise economy would not be a feasible (or 
necessary) goal, a formalization program should produce both a substantial 
decrease in informal business activity and a substantial increase in formal 
firm operation. 
In our research, we set out to collect as much of this data as possible; 
however, we discovered that the Colombian statistics agency that collects 
this data applied different methods for data collection before and after the 
law was passed.172 Prior to passage, a substantial survey of all firms was 
conducted that captured extensive firm information, including compliance 
with registration and tax laws. After passage, the agency shifted its approach 
to using only a sample of small firms to extrapolate general conclusions. The 
data reflect very different results, as shown below. 
 
Figure 9. Percentage of Colombian Firms Not Registered with the 
Chamber of Commerce. 
Source:  DANE Survey of Microestablishments (2004-2014). 
 
Though promising at first blush, the data presented in Figure 9, which 
comes from the DANE’s national micro-enterprise survey, do not accurately 
reflect the degree of firm informality in Colombia nor the effects of Law 
1429.173 Rather, it reflects the change in methodology from a survey of over 
 
registered). 
 172  See also von Elk & de Kok, supra note 64, at 70 (noting the uncertain correlation between data 
sets on informality in Colombia post-passage of Law 1429). 
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one million firms to a sample of less than 40,000.174 In fact, the DANE itself 
issued a report entitled “Prosperity for All” in 2014 as part of their National 
Development Plan,175 noting that over the previous five years, the rate of firm 
informality in Colombia based upon the number of firms that have registered 
or renewed their registration with the Chamber of Commerce averages 
55%.176 
Another source that we examined to assess levels of firm informality is 
the DANE household survey.177 This survey, similar to a census, asks 
questions about the lives of individuals, including their employment status. 
One of the questions posed on more recent surveys was whether the 
individual operated a business and, if so, how that business was formed. In 
the most recent iteration of that survey, individuals claiming to operate a 
business without registration with the Chamber of Commerce exceeded 71% 
(see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Colombian Micro-enterprises by Registration Status (2014). 
 
Source:  DANE Household Survey (2014). 
 
Finally, as a third comparative source of data, we examined data from 
the Chamber of Commerce itself. This data is presented with the caveat that 
the Chamber has a vested interest in encouraging firm registration as they 
retain the registration fees paid by formal firms. The information in the 
 
 174  Todos Por Un Nuevo Pais, DANE (2017) (providing access to the irregular micro-enterprise 
surveys and showing a shift in methodology in 2011 from survey data to panel survey data), 
http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/comercio-interior/Microestablecimientos/107-boletines/ 
microestablec/5410-Microestablecimientos-InformacionHistotica.  
 175  Plan Nacional de Desarollo 2010–2014 (National Development Plan 2010–2014), DANE at 127, 
https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/PND/PND2010-2014%20Tomo%20I%20CD.pdf. 
 176  Id. at 128 (noting that the percentage of informal micro-enterprises in Colombia grew from 53.7% 
in 2006 to 55.4% in 2008). 
 177  Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (National Household Survey), DANE (2017), 
http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/mercado-laboral/encuesta-nacional-de-hogares.  
Blue: No Registration 
Orange: Registered as private party 
Green: Registered as a business 
Red:  No data 
DOCUMENT3 (DO NOT  DELETE) 9/10/17  3:59 PM 
Incentivizing Gray Market Entrepreneurs 
37:415 (2017) 
451 
RUES178 Confecamaras database reflects the number of firms that registered 
or renewed their registration under the formalization law. The law did not 
differentiate by firm size, which means that it would count not only micro-
enterprises (more likely to be informal), but also medium and large 
enterprises that may have terminated their prior registration and re-registered 
as new entities to receive benefits under the law. 
The database shows that between the entry into force of the law on 
December 29, 2010 and December 2013, 622,226179 firms took advantage of 
the law’s favorable tax and registration regime (Articles 5 and 7), generating 
about 595,381 jobs.180 Additionally, 91,131 firms formed before 2010 
benefited from the formal registration discount offered by the law by re-
registering after the law’s passage. As noted above, a substantial number of 
these firms were renewing their registration under the law rather than 
registering as prevously informal firms.181 
 
Figure 11. Enterprises Receiving Discounted Registration Fees. 
 






registration as formal 
firms 
Total number of 
firms that 
benefited 
2011 200,721 89,771 290,703 
2012 425,193 91,131 507,023 
2013 622,226 91,131 712,357 
Source: Colombian Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism. 
 
The data in Figure 11 was not broken down to reflect the number of 
micro-enterprises (fewer than ten employees) that comprise the total of newly 
registered firms. However, using data from the DANE covering the year 
2013, we can extrapolate the percentage of newly formed micro-enterprises 
that registered under the law. The percentages shown in Figure 12 (below) 
indicate that micro-enterprises were much less likely to take advantage of the 
new law. The DANE further breaks down the data by the three largest sectors 
 
 178  Registro Unico Empresarial (Single Business Registry). 
 179  This value takes into account the changes in GDP and growth of business in order to try to isolate 
the natural growth of businesses. 
 180  Informe de Rendición de Cuentas (Accountability Report), Ministerio del Trabajo (2013) (Planilla 
Integrada de Liquidación de Aportes (PILA) y Confecamaras - Cálculos Ministerio del Trabajo). 
 181  See, e.g., Externado, supra note 160, at 27–28. 
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of registered firms: retail, services, and industry. Only 3.6% of the small 
enterprises with 6 to 9 employees in the industrial sector benefited from the 
law. This was 3.6% in the service sector and 4.2% in the retail sector. When 
looking at small enterprises with one to five employees, this percentage drops 
to less than 1.4%. The size of the business usually is related to its level of 
formality, and this data supports this theory. 
 
Figure 12. Percentage of Micro-enterprises Registering after 2010. 
 
The data that we analyzed indicate that Law 1429 did not significantly 
reduce the level of informality among firms in Colombia. However, given 
the change in methodology by the agency that collects this precise data, we 
cannot assert this conclusion with a high level of confidence. We were 
informed by the Ministry of Commerce that they are aware of this issue and 
are working with the DANE to implement a consistent data collection 
approach to monitor firm informality in Colombia.182 However, we can draw 
important lessons from Colombia’s implementation of its enterprise 
formalization program that can be applied in a number of other contexts. We 
discuss these below. 
 
 182  Notes from author’s discussion with the Office of Formalization Programs of the Colombian 
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 VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Law 1429 set out to reduce informality in the Colombian marketplace 
by incentivizing formal business registration through temporarily reduced 
taxes and other government payments.183 Though the law succeeded in 
formalizing a number of existing firms that were attracted these benefits, only 
a very small percentage of those firms were micro-enterprises, where firm 
informality is by far most prevalent.184 In addition, a substantial number of 
firms registered for the initial year to take advantage of the benefits of the 
law, but then failed to register the following year either due to insufficient 
resources or lack of will. 
The law has failed to achieve its goal of substantially reducing the size 
of the informal enterprise sector.185 One of the principal reasons for this 
failure is the law’s basic theoretical premise that regulatory costs are the most 
significant barrier to formalization.186 And while this appears to be an 
important factor, it is not the underlying reason a business will choose to 
avoid regulatory compliance. 
As discussed earlier in this study, many informal firms operate below 
or at a baseline productivity level, making success as a formal firm with its 
associated costs of doing business an often insurmountable task. And 
“formalization per se may not address the fundamental determinants of 
productivity.”187  Even with the temporary reprieve in some of these costs, 
partial formalization implies operating openly, facing scrutiny from both the 
public and private sectors. The benefits available in return for taking this risk 
appear limited, at best, and firms are acutely aware of this limited tradeoff.188 
Policies aimed at addressing the problem of informality should contain 
the key elements that influence informality, including both the institutional 
factors that encourage business and labor formalization as well as the policies 
necessary to enhance individual and enterprise performance, in order to 
facilitate and encourage transition into the formal economy. As we discussed 
earlier in this paper, theories on how to reduce informality suggest 
establishing both policies that foster formalization of firms through 
 
 183  L. 1429, Dec. 29, 2010 (Colom.) (describing the goal of formalizing small enterprises).  
 184  See, e.g., supra Figure 12. 
 185  See, e.g., La Informalidad en Colombia Recupera Fuerzas (Informality in Colombia Recovers 
Force), DINERO (Aug. 26, 2015) (explaining that, though informality has declined since 2012 overall, it 
has risen since 2014), http://www.dinero.com/economia/articulo/informalidad-colombia-2015/212697. 
 186  Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar, Informal Economy: Is it a Problem, a Solution, or Both? The Perspective 
of the Informal Business, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. & ECON. PAPERS (2006). 
 187  Ana-Maria Oviedo, Economic Informality: Causes, Costs, and Policies: A Literature Survey of 
International Experience, WORLD BANK (2009), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TURKEYEXTN/ 
Resources/361711-1277211666558/bpg_CausesCostsAndPolicies.pdf. 
 188  See Melendez, supra note 149, at 10 (conducting a survey of informal firms and finding that a 
majority do not find registration useful or worthwhile).  
DOCUMENT3 (DO NOT DELETE) 9/10/17  3:59 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 37:415 (2017) 
454 
incentives that lower the costs of doing business legitimately and also 
increasing the benefits of being formal. Law 1429 fails to address these 
structural factors comprehensively. 
The law provides some of the benefits recommended by the theories 
discussed earlier—principally, lower costs for doing formal business.189 
Nevertheless, the law appears to have overlooked several key structural 
factors:  i) effective marketing of the law to the informal business 
community—many informal firms were unaware of the law and thus could 
not take advantage of its benefits; ii) fear of exposure—many informal small 
businesses (survivalist firms)190 don´t want to grow because of the probability 
of being detected by the government and being subjected to additional costs, 
disincentivizing a registration process that emphasizes benefits for larger 
firms; and, iii) limited benefits—the law provides few if any benefits that a 
micro-enterprise would be interested in receiving, such as access to credit, 
business development guidance, and protection of their investment through 
loan guarantees, bankruptcy protection, and access to courts. 
In addition, there is a significant problem with enforcement of laws 
regulating the operation of businesses in most emerging markets.191 We have 
said that inclusion of workers and firms in the legal and regulatory state 
structure began with the development of regulatory mechanisms for business 
operations and labor formality. But there are few incentives to avoid 
informality for most micro-enterprises.192 Few penalties exist or are enforced 
against informal firms that would discourage them from remaining 
informal.193 With little enforcement of the law, and little benefit in 
compliance with the law, informal firms often prefer to remain informal. 
The Formalization Office of the Ministry of Commerce in Colombia is 
working aggressively to find rational solutions to the problem of firm 
informality.194 They have thus far launched three pilot programs aimed at 
providing informal firms exhibiting a minimal degree of productivity with 
 
 189  See De Soto, supra note 71, at 102.  
 190  See Fandl, supra note 78 (describing survivalist firms as those which would fail but for the benefits 
offered by non-compliant firm operation). 
   191  See generally, Louise Kantrow, Enabling Environment for Rule-based Business and Investment, 
Remarks to the UN Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing 
(Mar. 3, 2014); Doing business in high-risk countries, Basel Institute on Governance advises, WORLD 
FIN., Mar. 10, 2015. 
 192  See, e.g., Enterprise Formalization: Fact or Fiction?, ILO (2014) (discussing the minimal effect 
that unenforced laws have on discouraging unlawful informal activities), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/ 
groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/@ifp_seed/documents/publication/wcms_245359.pdf. 
 193  See Codigo de Comercio, art. 37 [Colombia] (levying a fine up to 10,000 pesos for persons 
operating a business without registration). 
 194  See Colombia se Formaliza (Colombia Formalizes), MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY, AND 
TOURISM, http://colombiaseformaliza.com/ejes-del-programa/brigadas-para-la-formalizacion/.  
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the means to improve their operation.195 These programs include:  1) 
providing expert evaluations of small retail firms operating as part of larger 
supply chains to identify mechanisms for process improvements; 2) 
providing consultants to service firms for a period of time to share 
management and productivity techniques with small firm owners; and, 3) 
establishing partnrships between less productive firm owners and offering 
resources to facilitate a small business growth model.196 Preliminary results 
of these pilot programs are promising, though the scale is quite small as the 
ministry has limited resources to invest in firm formalization.197 
 VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Along the lines of what the pilot programs in Colombia have been 
doing, we recommend that a developing country interested in reducing its 
informal enterprise sector carefully consider the benefits that compliance 
with regulatory formalities will provide to different types of firms. A one-
size-fits-all solution to informal business activity is destined to fail. Some 
small firms require management training, access to credit, networking 
opportunities, and other incentives that can be provided either by government 
or the private sector. Others require capital infusions to purchase inventory, 
space, and perhaps to hire staff. And still others in the “survivalist” sphere 
require more direct government assistance through education and linkages 
with other firms to facilitate some degree of growth in productivity. In some 
cases, firms in the last category may simply need to be eliminated in 
exchange for employment opportunities within more productive firms. 
The incentives provided by formalization programs such as the one 
discussed in this paper encouraged already productive firms to test the waters 
of formality and may have encouraged unproductive firms to expose 
themselves to the formal marketplace temporarily. Yet this is a short-term 
and short-sighted solution. The root cause of firm informality is likely 
structural—high unemployment is creating “forced entrepreneurs” who have 
no choice but to open an unregulated business in order to generate income. 
Some of these firms are no doubt operated by potentially successful 
entrepreneurs. Yet many serve a more limited and more immediate need—
economic survival.198 These firms do not benefit and might even be harmed 
by formalization programs that bring them into the light with promises of 
productivity and legality only to see them flounder and fail under the pressure 
 
 195  Based on author’s interviews with Ministry representatives. 
 196  Id. 
 197  Id. 
 198  See, e.g., WORLD BANK, supra note 26, at 66. 
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of competition.199 
The goal of a sucessful formalization program must be improvements 
in business productivity.200 A firm that can compete with regulated firms is a 
firm that will seek out formality because those firms will benefit from 
opportunities to expand, hire workers, access credit, and market their 
enterprise. Those very firms will create job opportunities that might be filled 
by survivalist “forced entrepreneurs,” ultimately reducing the size of the 
informal sector.201 
Until the government is able to get the incentives right by focusing on 
improvements in firm productivity, the informal firm sector will continue to 
grow. And while the informal marketplace thrives, foreign investors will be 
discouraged from developing a presence in these emerging markets, feeding 
a cycle of low economic growth. Finding the right path to inclusive firm 
regulation is the surest way forward in boosting domestic economic growth 




 199  Id. at 73 (explaining that many firms self-select into informality due to their low-productivity 
endeavors and would not improve productivity if formalized).  
 200  See PERRY ET AL., supra note 23, at 15. 
 201  See, e.g., Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, 
WORLD BANK (2013) (indicating that improvements in the regulatory regime will likely lead to more firm 
registration by true entrepreneurs and more wage-based employment by “forced entrepreneurs” in the 
survivalist cycle). 
